On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The mutual compatibility of four recently discussed axioms on solution concepts for extensive form games is explored. Two subsets of the axioms are shown to be inconsistent. Our results underline the importance of the information lost in moving from the extensive form to the normal (or agent-normal) form of a game.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)169-174
    Number of pages6
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume34
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1984

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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