On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The mutual compatibility of four recently discussed axioms on solution concepts for extensive form games is explored. Two subsets of the axioms are shown to be inconsistent. Our results underline the importance of the information lost in moving from the extensive form to the normal (or agent-normal) form of a game.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)169-174
    Number of pages6
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume34
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1984

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    Axioms
    Solution concepts
    Non-cooperative game
    Inconsistency
    Extensive form games
    Extensive form
    Normal form
    Compatibility

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games. / Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1984, p. 169-174.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David. / On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1984 ; Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 169-174.
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