On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Juan A. Lacomba, Francisco Lagos, Ernesto Reuben, Frans van Winden

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and higher overall efficiency. With repeated interaction, appropriative efforts are considerably reduced because some groups manage to avoid fighting altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making themselves vulnerable and by forgoing the possibility to appropriate the resources of defeated opponents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)40-57
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume86
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

Fingerprint

Repeated interaction
Escalation
Resources
Appropriation
Peace

Keywords

  • Appropriation
  • Conflict
  • Contests
  • Escalation
  • Peace
  • Rent-seeking
  • Tournaments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. / Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; van Winden, Frans.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 86, 01.01.2014, p. 40-57.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Lacomba, Juan A. ; Lagos, Francisco ; Reuben, Ernesto ; van Winden, Frans. / On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2014 ; Vol. 86. pp. 40-57.
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