On perfect and adaptive security in exposure-resilient cryptography

Yevgeniy Dodis, Amit Sahai, Adam Smith

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider the question of adaptive security for two related cryptographic primitives: all-or-nothing transforms and exposure-resilient functions. Both are concerned with retaining security when an intruder learns some bits of a string which is supposed to be secret: all-or-nothing transforms (AONT) protect their input even given partial knowledge of the output; exposure-resilient functions (ERF) hide their output even given partial exposure of their input. Both of these primitives can be defined in the perfect, statistical and computational settings and have a variety of applications in cryptography. In this paper, we study how these notions fare against adaptive adversaries, who may choose which positions of a secret string to observe on the fly. In the perfect setting, we prove a new, strong lower bound on the con-structibility of (perfect) AONT. This applies to both standard and adap-tively secure AONT. In particular, to hide an input as short as logn bits, the adversary must see no more than half of the n-bit output. This bound also provides a new impossibility result on the existence of (ramp) secret-sharing schemes [6] and relates to a combinatorial problem of independent interest: finding “balanced” colorings of the hypercube. In the statistical setting, we show that adaptivity adds strictly more power to the adversary. We relate and reduce the construction of adaptive ERF’s to that of almost-perfect resilient functions [19], for which the adversary can actually set some of the input positions and still learn nothing about the output. We give a probabilistic construction of these functions which is essentially optimal and substantially improves on previous constructions of [19, 5]. As a result, we get nearly optimal adaptively secure ERF’s and AONT’s. Finally, extending the statistical construction we obtain optimal computational adaptive ERF’s, “public-value” AONT’s and resilient functions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001 - International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages301-324
Number of pages24
Volume2045
ISBN (Print)3540420703
StatePublished - 2001
EventInternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2001 - Innsbruck, Austria
Duration: May 6 2001May 10 2001

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2045
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

OtherInternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2001
CountryAustria
CityInnsbruck
Period5/6/015/10/01

Fingerprint

Resilient Functions
Cryptography
Transform
Output
Strings
Partial
Secret Sharing Scheme
Adaptivity
Combinatorial Problems
Coloring
Hypercube
Value Function
Colouring
Strictly
Choose
Lower bound

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Dodis, Y., Sahai, A., & Smith, A. (2001). On perfect and adaptive security in exposure-resilient cryptography. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001 - International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings (Vol. 2045, pp. 301-324). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2045). Springer Verlag.

On perfect and adaptive security in exposure-resilient cryptography. / Dodis, Yevgeniy; Sahai, Amit; Smith, Adam.

Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001 - International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. Vol. 2045 Springer Verlag, 2001. p. 301-324 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2045).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dodis, Y, Sahai, A & Smith, A 2001, On perfect and adaptive security in exposure-resilient cryptography. in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001 - International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. vol. 2045, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 2045, Springer Verlag, pp. 301-324, International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2001, Innsbruck, Austria, 5/6/01.
Dodis Y, Sahai A, Smith A. On perfect and adaptive security in exposure-resilient cryptography. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001 - International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. Vol. 2045. Springer Verlag. 2001. p. 301-324. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
Dodis, Yevgeniy ; Sahai, Amit ; Smith, Adam. / On perfect and adaptive security in exposure-resilient cryptography. Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001 - International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. Vol. 2045 Springer Verlag, 2001. pp. 301-324 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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