On human capital and team stability

Pierre André Chiappori, Alfred Galichon, Bernard Salanié

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships in the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)236-259
    Number of pages24
    JournalJournal of Human Capital
    Volume13
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 1 2019

    Fingerprint

    Stable matching
    Human capital
    Empirical study
    Economics
    Labour market
    Marriage
    Matching problem
    Substitute
    Policy intervention

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    Chiappori, P. A., Galichon, A., & Salanié, B. (2019). On human capital and team stability. Journal of Human Capital, 13(2), 236-259. https://doi.org/10.1086/702925

    On human capital and team stability. / Chiappori, Pierre André; Galichon, Alfred; Salanié, Bernard.

    In: Journal of Human Capital, Vol. 13, No. 2, 01.06.2019, p. 236-259.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Chiappori, PA, Galichon, A & Salanié, B 2019, 'On human capital and team stability', Journal of Human Capital, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 236-259. https://doi.org/10.1086/702925
    Chiappori PA, Galichon A, Salanié B. On human capital and team stability. Journal of Human Capital. 2019 Jun 1;13(2):236-259. https://doi.org/10.1086/702925
    Chiappori, Pierre André ; Galichon, Alfred ; Salanié, Bernard. / On human capital and team stability. In: Journal of Human Capital. 2019 ; Vol. 13, No. 2. pp. 236-259.
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