On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development

Hassan Salmani, Mohammad Tehranipoor, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The areas of hardware security and trust have experienced major growth over the past several years. However, research in Trojan detection and prevention lacks standard benchmarks and measurements, resulting in inconsistent research outcomes, and ambiguity in analyzing strengths and weaknesses in the techniques developed by different research teams and their advancements to the state-of-the-art. We have developed innovative methodologies that, for the first time, more effectively address the problem. We have developed a vulnerability analysis flow. The flow determines hard-to-detect areas in a circuit that would most probably be used for Trojan implementation to ensure a Trojan goes undetected during production test and extensive functional test analysis. Furthermore, we introduce the Trojan detectability metric to quantify Trojan activation and effect. This metric offers a fair comparison for analyzing weaknesses and strengths of Trojan detection techniques. Using these methodologies, we have developed a large number of trust benchmarks that are available for use by the public, as well as researchers and practitioners in the field.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages471-474
Number of pages4
ISBN (Print)9781479929870
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013 - Asheville, NC, United States
Duration: Oct 6 2013Oct 9 2013

Other

Other2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013
CountryUnited States
CityAsheville, NC
Period10/6/1310/9/13

Fingerprint

Chemical activation
Networks (circuits)
Hardware security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Hardware and Architecture

Cite this

Salmani, H., Tehranipoor, M., & Karri, R. (2013). On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development. In 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013 (pp. 471-474). [6657085] IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCD.2013.6657085

On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development. / Salmani, Hassan; Tehranipoor, Mohammad; Karri, Ramesh.

2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013. IEEE Computer Society, 2013. p. 471-474 6657085.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Salmani, H, Tehranipoor, M & Karri, R 2013, On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development. in 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013., 6657085, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 471-474, 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013, Asheville, NC, United States, 10/6/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCD.2013.6657085
Salmani H, Tehranipoor M, Karri R. On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development. In 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013. IEEE Computer Society. 2013. p. 471-474. 6657085 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCD.2013.6657085
Salmani, Hassan ; Tehranipoor, Mohammad ; Karri, Ramesh. / On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development. 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013. IEEE Computer Society, 2013. pp. 471-474
@inproceedings{d8e51a9cd99a4b64b50e88cd916e7276,
title = "On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development",
abstract = "The areas of hardware security and trust have experienced major growth over the past several years. However, research in Trojan detection and prevention lacks standard benchmarks and measurements, resulting in inconsistent research outcomes, and ambiguity in analyzing strengths and weaknesses in the techniques developed by different research teams and their advancements to the state-of-the-art. We have developed innovative methodologies that, for the first time, more effectively address the problem. We have developed a vulnerability analysis flow. The flow determines hard-to-detect areas in a circuit that would most probably be used for Trojan implementation to ensure a Trojan goes undetected during production test and extensive functional test analysis. Furthermore, we introduce the Trojan detectability metric to quantify Trojan activation and effect. This metric offers a fair comparison for analyzing weaknesses and strengths of Trojan detection techniques. Using these methodologies, we have developed a large number of trust benchmarks that are available for use by the public, as well as researchers and practitioners in the field.",
author = "Hassan Salmani and Mohammad Tehranipoor and Ramesh Karri",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1109/ICCD.2013.6657085",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781479929870",
pages = "471--474",
booktitle = "2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013",
publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development

AU - Salmani, Hassan

AU - Tehranipoor, Mohammad

AU - Karri, Ramesh

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - The areas of hardware security and trust have experienced major growth over the past several years. However, research in Trojan detection and prevention lacks standard benchmarks and measurements, resulting in inconsistent research outcomes, and ambiguity in analyzing strengths and weaknesses in the techniques developed by different research teams and their advancements to the state-of-the-art. We have developed innovative methodologies that, for the first time, more effectively address the problem. We have developed a vulnerability analysis flow. The flow determines hard-to-detect areas in a circuit that would most probably be used for Trojan implementation to ensure a Trojan goes undetected during production test and extensive functional test analysis. Furthermore, we introduce the Trojan detectability metric to quantify Trojan activation and effect. This metric offers a fair comparison for analyzing weaknesses and strengths of Trojan detection techniques. Using these methodologies, we have developed a large number of trust benchmarks that are available for use by the public, as well as researchers and practitioners in the field.

AB - The areas of hardware security and trust have experienced major growth over the past several years. However, research in Trojan detection and prevention lacks standard benchmarks and measurements, resulting in inconsistent research outcomes, and ambiguity in analyzing strengths and weaknesses in the techniques developed by different research teams and their advancements to the state-of-the-art. We have developed innovative methodologies that, for the first time, more effectively address the problem. We have developed a vulnerability analysis flow. The flow determines hard-to-detect areas in a circuit that would most probably be used for Trojan implementation to ensure a Trojan goes undetected during production test and extensive functional test analysis. Furthermore, we introduce the Trojan detectability metric to quantify Trojan activation and effect. This metric offers a fair comparison for analyzing weaknesses and strengths of Trojan detection techniques. Using these methodologies, we have developed a large number of trust benchmarks that are available for use by the public, as well as researchers and practitioners in the field.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84892521405&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84892521405&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ICCD.2013.6657085

DO - 10.1109/ICCD.2013.6657085

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781479929870

SP - 471

EP - 474

BT - 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2013

PB - IEEE Computer Society

ER -