On combining implementable social choice rules

Jean Pierre Benoît, Ahmet Ok, M. Remzi Sanver

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)20-30
    Number of pages11
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume60
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2007

    Fingerprint

    Social choice rule
    Nature
    Dominant strategy

    Keywords

    • Dominant strategy implementation
    • Largest implementable subcorrespondence
    • Maskin monotonicity
    • Minimal monotonic extension
    • Nash implementation

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    On combining implementable social choice rules. / Benoît, Jean Pierre; Ok, Ahmet; Sanver, M. Remzi.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 60, No. 1, 07.2007, p. 20-30.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Benoît, Jean Pierre ; Ok, Ahmet ; Sanver, M. Remzi. / On combining implementable social choice rules. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2007 ; Vol. 60, No. 1. pp. 20-30.
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