On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment

Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A two period choice problem is presented. An individual has to choose in each period between legal and illegal activities. Two punishment policies are compared: (1) The maximal punishment is imposed even for a first offense. (2) A new offender gets a reduced punishment. It is proved that for a given policy of type 1 there exist a utility function and a policy of type 2 which yields a better deterrent on individual characterized by this utility function.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)89-94
    Number of pages6
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume6
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1980

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    Anomaly
    Punishment
    Utility function

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment. / Rubinstein, Ariel.

    In: Economics Letters, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1980, p. 89-94.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Rubinstein, Ariel. / On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment. In: Economics Letters. 1980 ; Vol. 6, No. 1. pp. 89-94.
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