Nosy preferences, benevolence, and efficiency

Chetan Dave, Stefan Dodds

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We explore the implications of "nosy" preferences-when individuals have rankings over the specific actions of others-using recent theoretical results in the behavioral economics literature. Our model jointly captures preference interdependence over utilities (benevolence) and actions (nosiness). We apply the model to two well-known environments. The first is a classic social choice problem; the second is a model of relative consumption concerns. For the former we characterize the existence of the impossibility once the social choice problem has been modeled as a behavioral game. For the latter we characterize when the negative externality arising from relative consumption concerns can be overcome without a policy intervention.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)878-894
Number of pages17
JournalSouthern Economic Journal
Volume78
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

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Benevolence
Social choice
Relative consumption
Individual preferences
Policy intervention
Impossibility
Ranking
Interdependence
Negative externalities

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Nosy preferences, benevolence, and efficiency. / Dave, Chetan; Dodds, Stefan.

In: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 78, No. 3, 01.01.2012, p. 878-894.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Dave, Chetan ; Dodds, Stefan. / Nosy preferences, benevolence, and efficiency. In: Southern Economic Journal. 2012 ; Vol. 78, No. 3. pp. 878-894.
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