Nosy preferences, benevolence, and efficiency

Chetan Dave, Stefan Dodds

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We explore the implications of "nosy" preferences-when individuals have rankings over the specific actions of others-using recent theoretical results in the behavioral economics literature. Our model jointly captures preference interdependence over utilities (benevolence) and actions (nosiness). We apply the model to two well-known environments. The first is a classic social choice problem; the second is a model of relative consumption concerns. For the former we characterize the existence of the impossibility once the social choice problem has been modeled as a behavioral game. For the latter we characterize when the negative externality arising from relative consumption concerns can be overcome without a policy intervention.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)878-894
    Number of pages17
    JournalSouthern Economic Journal
    Volume78
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

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    Benevolence
    Social choice
    Relative consumption
    Individual preferences
    Policy intervention
    Ranking
    Impossibility
    Interdependence
    Negative externalities

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Nosy preferences, benevolence, and efficiency. / Dave, Chetan; Dodds, Stefan.

    In: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 78, No. 3, 01.01.2012, p. 878-894.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Dave, Chetan ; Dodds, Stefan. / Nosy preferences, benevolence, and efficiency. In: Southern Economic Journal. 2012 ; Vol. 78, No. 3. pp. 878-894.
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