Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment

Loukas Balafoutas, Nikos Nikiforakis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such behavior in the field. We study the propensity to punish norm violators in a natural field experiment conducted in the main subway station in Athens, Greece. The large number of passengers ensures that strategic motives for punishing are minimized. We study violations of two distinct efficiency-enhancing social norms. In line with laboratory evidence, we find that individuals punish norm violators. However, these individuals are a minority. Men are more likely than women to punish violators, while the decision to punish is unaffected by the violator's height and gender. Interestingly, we find that violations of the better known of the two norms are substantially less likely to trigger punishment. We present additional evidence from two surveys providing insights into the determinants of norm enforcement.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1773-1785
Number of pages13
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume56
Issue number8
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2012

Fingerprint

Enforcement
Natural field experiment
Violations
Social norms
Punishment
Athens
Trigger
Greece
Interaction
Propensity
Minorities
Laboratory experiments

Keywords

  • Altruistic punishment
  • Cooperation
  • Field experiment
  • Norm enforcement
  • Social norms

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Norm enforcement in the city : A natural field experiment. / Balafoutas, Loukas; Nikiforakis, Nikos.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 8, 01.11.2012, p. 1773-1785.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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