Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

Rabah Amir, Igor Evstigneev, John Wooders

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)183-207
    Number of pages25
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume42
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2003

    Fingerprint

    Spillover
    Two-stage model
    Profit
    Product market
    Cartels
    Symmetry
    Expenditure
    Optimality
    Product market competition

    Keywords

    • Endogenous spillovers
    • Oligopolistic R&D
    • R&D cartel
    • Research joint ventures

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates. / Amir, Rabah; Evstigneev, Igor; Wooders, John.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 42, No. 2, 01.01.2003, p. 183-207.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Amir, Rabah ; Evstigneev, Igor ; Wooders, John. / Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2003 ; Vol. 42, No. 2. pp. 183-207.
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