Nonasymptotic mean-field games

Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been shown to be useful in some applications. However, the stylized game model with continuum of decision-makers is rarely observed in practice and the approximation proposed in the asymptotic regime is meaningless for networked systems with few entities. In this paper we propose a mean-field framework that is suitable not only for large systems but also for a small world with few number of entities. The applicability of the proposed framework is illustrated through a dynamic auction with asymmetric valuation distributions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings
    PublisherIFAC Secretariat
    Pages8989-8994
    Number of pages6
    Volume19
    ISBN (Electronic)9783902823625
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
    Event19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014 - Cape Town, South Africa
    Duration: Aug 24 2014Aug 29 2014

    Other

    Other19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014
    CountrySouth Africa
    CityCape Town
    Period8/24/148/29/14

    Keywords

    • Game theory
    • Mean-field
    • Non-asymptotic

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Control and Systems Engineering

    Cite this

    Hamidou, T. (2014). Nonasymptotic mean-field games. In 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings (Vol. 19, pp. 8989-8994). IFAC Secretariat.

    Nonasymptotic mean-field games. / Hamidou, Tembine.

    19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19 IFAC Secretariat, 2014. p. 8989-8994.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Hamidou, T 2014, Nonasymptotic mean-field games. in 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. vol. 19, IFAC Secretariat, pp. 8989-8994, 19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014, Cape Town, South Africa, 8/24/14.
    Hamidou T. Nonasymptotic mean-field games. In 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19. IFAC Secretariat. 2014. p. 8989-8994
    Hamidou, Tembine. / Nonasymptotic mean-field games. 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19 IFAC Secretariat, 2014. pp. 8989-8994
    @inproceedings{d3c1ae883ca74717816ac3326e3ab09f,
    title = "Nonasymptotic mean-field games",
    abstract = "Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been shown to be useful in some applications. However, the stylized game model with continuum of decision-makers is rarely observed in practice and the approximation proposed in the asymptotic regime is meaningless for networked systems with few entities. In this paper we propose a mean-field framework that is suitable not only for large systems but also for a small world with few number of entities. The applicability of the proposed framework is illustrated through a dynamic auction with asymmetric valuation distributions.",
    keywords = "Game theory, Mean-field, Non-asymptotic",
    author = "Tembine Hamidou",
    year = "2014",
    month = "1",
    day = "1",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "19",
    pages = "8989--8994",
    booktitle = "19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings",
    publisher = "IFAC Secretariat",

    }

    TY - GEN

    T1 - Nonasymptotic mean-field games

    AU - Hamidou, Tembine

    PY - 2014/1/1

    Y1 - 2014/1/1

    N2 - Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been shown to be useful in some applications. However, the stylized game model with continuum of decision-makers is rarely observed in practice and the approximation proposed in the asymptotic regime is meaningless for networked systems with few entities. In this paper we propose a mean-field framework that is suitable not only for large systems but also for a small world with few number of entities. The applicability of the proposed framework is illustrated through a dynamic auction with asymmetric valuation distributions.

    AB - Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been shown to be useful in some applications. However, the stylized game model with continuum of decision-makers is rarely observed in practice and the approximation proposed in the asymptotic regime is meaningless for networked systems with few entities. In this paper we propose a mean-field framework that is suitable not only for large systems but also for a small world with few number of entities. The applicability of the proposed framework is illustrated through a dynamic auction with asymmetric valuation distributions.

    KW - Game theory

    KW - Mean-field

    KW - Non-asymptotic

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84929832850&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84929832850&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    M3 - Conference contribution

    VL - 19

    SP - 8989

    EP - 8994

    BT - 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings

    PB - IFAC Secretariat

    ER -