Nonasymptotic mean-field games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists of approximating large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been shown to be useful in some applications. However, the stylized game model with continuum of decision-makers is rarely observed in practice and the approximation proposed in the asymptotic regime is meaningless for networks with few entities. In this paper, we propose a mean-field framework that is suitable not only for large systems but also for a small world with few number of entities. The applicability of the proposed framework is illustrated through various examples including dynamic auction with asymmetric valuation distributions, and spiteful bidders.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6798664
Pages (from-to)2744-2756
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
Volume44
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2014

Keywords

  • Approximation
  • Games with few decision-makers
  • Nonasymptotic

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Information Systems
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Nonasymptotic mean-field games. / Hamidou, Tembine.

In: IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, Vol. 44, No. 12, 6798664, 01.12.2014, p. 2744-2756.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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