Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

Guillaume Frechette, John H. Kagel, Massimo Morelli

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1497-1517
    Number of pages21
    JournalJournal of Public Economics
    Volume89
    Issue number8 SPEC. ISS.
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Aug 2005

    Fingerprint

    Bargaining power
    Legislative bargaining
    Discounting
    Comparative statics
    Political Science
    Bargaining experiment
    Vote
    Legislatures
    Proportion
    Prediction
    Voting

    Keywords

    • Baron and Ferejohn
    • Gamson's Law
    • Legislative bargaining
    • Selection protocol

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining. / Frechette, Guillaume; Kagel, John H.; Morelli, Massimo.

    In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89, No. 8 SPEC. ISS., 08.2005, p. 1497-1517.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Frechette, Guillaume ; Kagel, John H. ; Morelli, Massimo. / Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2005 ; Vol. 89, No. 8 SPEC. ISS. pp. 1497-1517.
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