Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach

Alain Tcheukam Siwe, Tembine Hamidou

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We investigate dynamic public good games in networks consisting of strategic users with interdependent network security. The strategic users can choose their investment strategies to contribute to the basic security of the network. Mimicking the behavior of infection propagation over multi-hop networks which depends on the average degree of the network, we propose a mean-field-type model to capture the effect of the others' control actions on the security state. Using linear-quadratic differential mean-field-type games we propose and analyze two different regimes, examining the equilibria and global optima of each to address. We show that, generically, each user has a unique best response strategy to invest into security. Closed-form expressions are obtained using the recent development of mean-field-type game theory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages601-606
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509012916
DOIs
StatePublished - May 18 2016
Event13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 - Leipzig, Germany
Duration: Mar 21 2016Mar 24 2016

Other

Other13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
CountryGermany
CityLeipzig
Period3/21/163/24/16

Fingerprint

game theory
Network Security
Type Theory
Network security
Game theory
Game Theory
Mean Field
games
Game
Quadratic Differentials
Global Optimum
Multi-hop
Infection
infectious diseases
Closed-form
Choose
Propagation
propagation
Strategy

Keywords

  • Mean-field
  • Network security
  • Users' investment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Control and Optimization
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Instrumentation

Cite this

Siwe, A. T., & Hamidou, T. (2016). Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. In 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 (pp. 601-606). [7473659] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

Network security as public good : A mean-field-type game theory approach. / Siwe, Alain Tcheukam; Hamidou, Tembine.

13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 601-606 7473659.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Siwe, AT & Hamidou, T 2016, Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. in 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016., 7473659, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 601-606, 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016, Leipzig, Germany, 3/21/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659
Siwe AT, Hamidou T. Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. In 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 601-606. 7473659 https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659
Siwe, Alain Tcheukam ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Network security as public good : A mean-field-type game theory approach. 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 601-606
@inproceedings{bd30b02d7f12439aa8ac1375f1bea1e7,
title = "Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach",
abstract = "We investigate dynamic public good games in networks consisting of strategic users with interdependent network security. The strategic users can choose their investment strategies to contribute to the basic security of the network. Mimicking the behavior of infection propagation over multi-hop networks which depends on the average degree of the network, we propose a mean-field-type model to capture the effect of the others' control actions on the security state. Using linear-quadratic differential mean-field-type games we propose and analyze two different regimes, examining the equilibria and global optima of each to address. We show that, generically, each user has a unique best response strategy to invest into security. Closed-form expressions are obtained using the recent development of mean-field-type game theory.",
keywords = "Mean-field, Network security, Users' investment",
author = "Siwe, {Alain Tcheukam} and Tembine Hamidou",
year = "2016",
month = "5",
day = "18",
doi = "10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "601--606",
booktitle = "13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Network security as public good

T2 - A mean-field-type game theory approach

AU - Siwe, Alain Tcheukam

AU - Hamidou, Tembine

PY - 2016/5/18

Y1 - 2016/5/18

N2 - We investigate dynamic public good games in networks consisting of strategic users with interdependent network security. The strategic users can choose their investment strategies to contribute to the basic security of the network. Mimicking the behavior of infection propagation over multi-hop networks which depends on the average degree of the network, we propose a mean-field-type model to capture the effect of the others' control actions on the security state. Using linear-quadratic differential mean-field-type games we propose and analyze two different regimes, examining the equilibria and global optima of each to address. We show that, generically, each user has a unique best response strategy to invest into security. Closed-form expressions are obtained using the recent development of mean-field-type game theory.

AB - We investigate dynamic public good games in networks consisting of strategic users with interdependent network security. The strategic users can choose their investment strategies to contribute to the basic security of the network. Mimicking the behavior of infection propagation over multi-hop networks which depends on the average degree of the network, we propose a mean-field-type model to capture the effect of the others' control actions on the security state. Using linear-quadratic differential mean-field-type games we propose and analyze two different regimes, examining the equilibria and global optima of each to address. We show that, generically, each user has a unique best response strategy to invest into security. Closed-form expressions are obtained using the recent development of mean-field-type game theory.

KW - Mean-field

KW - Network security

KW - Users' investment

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84974603342&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84974603342&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

DO - 10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84974603342

SP - 601

EP - 606

BT - 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

ER -