Network security as public good

A mean-field-type game theory approach

Alain Tcheukam Siwe, Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    We investigate dynamic public good games in networks consisting of strategic users with interdependent network security. The strategic users can choose their investment strategies to contribute to the basic security of the network. Mimicking the behavior of infection propagation over multi-hop networks which depends on the average degree of the network, we propose a mean-field-type model to capture the effect of the others' control actions on the security state. Using linear-quadratic differential mean-field-type games we propose and analyze two different regimes, examining the equilibria and global optima of each to address. We show that, generically, each user has a unique best response strategy to invest into security. Closed-form expressions are obtained using the recent development of mean-field-type game theory.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages601-606
    Number of pages6
    ISBN (Electronic)9781509012916
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 18 2016
    Event13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 - Leipzig, Germany
    Duration: Mar 21 2016Mar 24 2016

    Other

    Other13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
    CountryGermany
    CityLeipzig
    Period3/21/163/24/16

    Fingerprint

    game theory
    Network Security
    Type Theory
    Network security
    Game theory
    Game Theory
    Mean Field
    games
    Game
    Quadratic Differentials
    Global Optimum
    Multi-hop
    Infection
    infectious diseases
    Closed-form
    Choose
    Propagation
    propagation
    Strategy

    Keywords

    • Mean-field
    • Network security
    • Users' investment

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Signal Processing
    • Control and Systems Engineering
    • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
    • Control and Optimization
    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Instrumentation

    Cite this

    Siwe, A. T., & Hamidou, T. (2016). Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. In 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 (pp. 601-606). [7473659] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

    Network security as public good : A mean-field-type game theory approach. / Siwe, Alain Tcheukam; Hamidou, Tembine.

    13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 601-606 7473659.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Siwe, AT & Hamidou, T 2016, Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. in 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016., 7473659, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 601-606, 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016, Leipzig, Germany, 3/21/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659
    Siwe AT, Hamidou T. Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. In 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 601-606. 7473659 https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659
    Siwe, Alain Tcheukam ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Network security as public good : A mean-field-type game theory approach. 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 601-606
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