Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin in Rev Econ stud 66: 23-38, 1999) is both necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice correspondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackon and Palfrey in J Econ Theory 98: 1-25, 2001).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)111-125
Number of pages15
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2007

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Social choice correspondence
Lottery
Nash implementation
Maskin monotonicity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms. / Bochet, Olivier.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 28, No. 1, 01.01.2007, p. 111-125.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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