Mutual optimism as a cause of conflict: Secret alliances and conflict onset

Muhammet Bas, Robert Schub

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

A prominent international-relations theory posits that mutual optimism, due to two sides holding divergent estimates of their relative bargaining power, causes interstate conflict. We develop a theory of mutual optimism in which conflicting bargaining power estimates arise from asymmetric information about which, if any, third parties will join either side in a military dispute. We contend that secret alliances can generate mutual optimism, which increases the probability of conflict. By exploiting secret alliances as a measurable source of private information, we provide the first systematic test of mutual optimism that directly assesses a state's secret capabilities. Optimism exists when a state's secret allies are more numerous or powerful than anticipated by opponents. Our empirical tests-as well as robustness checks-strongly support our theoretical expectation. We conclude that mutual optimism is an empirically, as well as theoretically, important cause of interstate conflict.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)552-564
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Studies Quarterly
Volume60
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2016

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optimism
cause
bargaining power
allies
international relations
Military

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Mutual optimism as a cause of conflict : Secret alliances and conflict onset. / Bas, Muhammet; Schub, Robert.

In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3, 01.09.2016, p. 552-564.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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