Motives and Implementation

On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two "cultures." In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by aprivate motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the first culture, every mechanism will have an equilibrium which does not achieve the public target, whereas the second culture gives rise to a mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome does achieve the public target. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)157-173
    Number of pages17
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume79
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 1998

    Fingerprint

    Economics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Motives and Implementation : On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions. / Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 79, No. 2, 04.1998, p. 157-173.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Glazer, Jacob ; Rubinstein, Ariel. / Motives and Implementation : On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1998 ; Vol. 79, No. 2. pp. 157-173.
    @article{e639f00109064ebe82b4da872c8ed818,
    title = "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions",
    abstract = "A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two {"}cultures.{"} In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by aprivate motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the first culture, every mechanism will have an equilibrium which does not achieve the public target, whereas the second culture gives rise to a mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome does achieve the public target. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.",
    author = "Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein",
    year = "1998",
    month = "4",
    doi = "10.1006/jeth.1997.2385",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "79",
    pages = "157--173",
    journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
    issn = "0022-0531",
    publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
    number = "2",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Motives and Implementation

    T2 - On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions

    AU - Glazer, Jacob

    AU - Rubinstein, Ariel

    PY - 1998/4

    Y1 - 1998/4

    N2 - A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two "cultures." In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by aprivate motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the first culture, every mechanism will have an equilibrium which does not achieve the public target, whereas the second culture gives rise to a mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome does achieve the public target. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.

    AB - A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two "cultures." In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by aprivate motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the first culture, every mechanism will have an equilibrium which does not achieve the public target, whereas the second culture gives rise to a mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome does achieve the public target. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0000247820&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0000247820&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2385

    DO - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2385

    M3 - Article

    VL - 79

    SP - 157

    EP - 173

    JO - Journal of Economic Theory

    JF - Journal of Economic Theory

    SN - 0022-0531

    IS - 2

    ER -