Microfluidic encryption of on-chip biochemical assays

Sk Subidh Ali, Mohamed Ibrahim, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Recent security analysis of digital micro-fluidic biochips (DMFBs) has revealed that the DMFB design flow is vulnerable to IP piracy, Trojan attacks, overproduction, and counterfeiting. An attacker can launch assay manipulation attacks against DMFBs that are used for clinical diagnostics in healthcare. Moreover, security for lab-on-chip has emerged as an important design criterion in view of the recent findings about spurious test results from Theranos Edison devices. We present encryption based on micro-fluidic multiplexers, wherein an assay is encrypted with a secret-key pattern of fluidic operations. Only an authorized user of the DMFB possesses the secret-key pattern and can get the correct assay outcome. Simulation results show that for practical assays, e.g., protein dilution, an 8-bit secret key is sufficient for overcoming threats to DMFBs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2016 IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages152-155
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781509029594
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 25 2017
Event12th IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Oct 17 2016Oct 19 2016

Other

Other12th IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period10/17/1610/19/16

Fingerprint

fluidics
Fluidics
Microfluidics
Biochips
Cryptography
Assays
chips
attack
multiplexing
Dilution
dilution
manipulators
proteins
Proteins

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Instrumentation
  • Biomedical Engineering

Cite this

Ali, S. S., Ibrahim, M., Sinanoglu, O., Chakrabarty, K., & Karri, R. (2017). Microfluidic encryption of on-chip biochemical assays. In Proceedings - 2016 IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016 (pp. 152-155). [7833754] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/BioCAS.2016.7833754

Microfluidic encryption of on-chip biochemical assays. / Ali, Sk Subidh; Ibrahim, Mohamed; Sinanoglu, Ozgur; Chakrabarty, Krishnendu; Karri, Ramesh.

Proceedings - 2016 IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 152-155 7833754.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Ali, SS, Ibrahim, M, Sinanoglu, O, Chakrabarty, K & Karri, R 2017, Microfluidic encryption of on-chip biochemical assays. in Proceedings - 2016 IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016., 7833754, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 152-155, 12th IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016, Shanghai, China, 10/17/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/BioCAS.2016.7833754
Ali SS, Ibrahim M, Sinanoglu O, Chakrabarty K, Karri R. Microfluidic encryption of on-chip biochemical assays. In Proceedings - 2016 IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2017. p. 152-155. 7833754 https://doi.org/10.1109/BioCAS.2016.7833754
Ali, Sk Subidh ; Ibrahim, Mohamed ; Sinanoglu, Ozgur ; Chakrabarty, Krishnendu ; Karri, Ramesh. / Microfluidic encryption of on-chip biochemical assays. Proceedings - 2016 IEEE Biomedical Circuits and Systems Conference, BioCAS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. pp. 152-155
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