Mean-field-type games on airline networks and airport queues: Braess paradox, its negation, and crowd effect

Alain Tcheukam Siwe, Tembine Hamidou

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper we study the performance of hub-based airline networks. We design, model and analyze the interactions using mean-field-type game theory. We identify three types of interactions between within the game: interaction between passengers, passengers-airlines, and interaction between airlines. The key mean-field terms are the traffic flow (or frequency of flights), number of people at the same slot per flight/airline. In absence of congestion, there is a dominating strategy for a designer to adopt the Hub network leading a negation of Braess Paradox. However, when the frequency of flights increases due to demand, the Hub network is no longer superior and all the links will be used, leading to an Enhanced Hub Network. At an Enhanced Hub network, higher prices (could be congestion-dependent) are charged to passengers taking the longer direct flights compared to the ones who transit via the Hub. We show that the resulting Stackelberg mean-field-type game with multiple leaders and multiple followers has an equilibrium and the equilibrium payoffs are compared in both type of networks. An analogy with communication networks is established with hybrid small base stations (femto, pico) and macro base stations. The small cell base stations help to work with low-power regime and save some energy. However, the femto cell network alone does not cover the entire area and does not dominate the market. It is shared with the enhanced macro cell.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages595-600
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509012916
DOIs
StatePublished - May 18 2016
Event13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 - Leipzig, Germany
Duration: Mar 21 2016Mar 24 2016

Other

Other13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
CountryGermany
CityLeipzig
Period3/21/163/24/16

Fingerprint

airports
games
paradoxes
Paradox
hubs
Airports
Mean Field
Queue
Base stations
Game
passengers
Macros
flight
congestion
stations
Interaction
Game theory
Congestion
Telecommunication networks
cells

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Control and Optimization
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Instrumentation

Cite this

Siwe, A. T., & Hamidou, T. (2016). Mean-field-type games on airline networks and airport queues: Braess paradox, its negation, and crowd effect. In 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 (pp. 595-600). [7473658] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473658

Mean-field-type games on airline networks and airport queues : Braess paradox, its negation, and crowd effect. / Siwe, Alain Tcheukam; Hamidou, Tembine.

13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 595-600 7473658.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Siwe, AT & Hamidou, T 2016, Mean-field-type games on airline networks and airport queues: Braess paradox, its negation, and crowd effect. in 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016., 7473658, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 595-600, 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016, Leipzig, Germany, 3/21/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473658
Siwe AT, Hamidou T. Mean-field-type games on airline networks and airport queues: Braess paradox, its negation, and crowd effect. In 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 595-600. 7473658 https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473658
Siwe, Alain Tcheukam ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Mean-field-type games on airline networks and airport queues : Braess paradox, its negation, and crowd effect. 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 595-600
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