Mathematics and democracy

Designing better voting and fair-division procedures

Steven Brams

    Research output: Book/ReportBook

    Abstract

    Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    PublisherPrinceton University Press
    Number of pages373
    ISBN (Electronic)9781400835591
    ISBN (Print)9780691133218
    StatePublished - Dec 2 2009

    Fingerprint

    Vote
    Voting
    voting
    Division
    voter
    mathematics
    democracy
    candidacy
    Indivisible
    Social Choice
    game theory
    Veins
    social institution
    political institution
    Game Theory
    Divisible
    Mathematical Analysis
    desert
    decision-making process
    Divides

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Mathematics(all)
    • Social Sciences(all)

    Cite this

    Mathematics and democracy : Designing better voting and fair-division procedures. / Brams, Steven.

    Princeton University Press, 2009. 373 p.

    Research output: Book/ReportBook

    Brams, Steven. / Mathematics and democracy : Designing better voting and fair-division procedures. Princeton University Press, 2009. 373 p.
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