Matchings with externalities and attitudes

Simina Brânzei, Tomasz Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Kate Larson, Nicholas R. Jennings

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

    Abstract

    Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real-life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents make. Such an influence is called an externality. Whereas fully expressive representations of externalities in matchings require exponential space, in this paper we propose a compact model of externalities, in which the influence of a match on each agent is computed additively. Under this framework, we analyze many-to-many matchings and one-to-one matchings where agents take different attitudes when reasoning about the actions of others. In particular, we study optimistic, neutral and pessimistic attitudes and provide both computational hardness results and polynomial-time algorithms for computing stable outcomes.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages295-302
    Number of pages8
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2013
    Event12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013 - Saint Paul, MN, United States
    Duration: May 6 2013May 10 2013

    Other

    Other12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013
    CountryUnited States
    CitySaint Paul, MN
    Period5/6/135/10/13

    Fingerprint

    Hardness
    Polynomials

    Keywords

    • Coalitional Games
    • Externalities
    • Matchings

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Artificial Intelligence

    Cite this

    Brânzei, S., Michalak, T., Rahwan, T., Larson, K., & Jennings, N. R. (2013). Matchings with externalities and attitudes. 295-302. Paper presented at 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, Saint Paul, MN, United States.

    Matchings with externalities and attitudes. / Brânzei, Simina; Michalak, Tomasz; Rahwan, Talal; Larson, Kate; Jennings, Nicholas R.

    2013. 295-302 Paper presented at 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, Saint Paul, MN, United States.

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

    Brânzei, S, Michalak, T, Rahwan, T, Larson, K & Jennings, NR 2013, 'Matchings with externalities and attitudes' Paper presented at 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, Saint Paul, MN, United States, 5/6/13 - 5/10/13, pp. 295-302.
    Brânzei S, Michalak T, Rahwan T, Larson K, Jennings NR. Matchings with externalities and attitudes. 2013. Paper presented at 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, Saint Paul, MN, United States.
    Brânzei, Simina ; Michalak, Tomasz ; Rahwan, Talal ; Larson, Kate ; Jennings, Nicholas R. / Matchings with externalities and attitudes. Paper presented at 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, Saint Paul, MN, United States.8 p.
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