Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms

Tingting Ding, Andrew Schotter

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    While, in theory, the school matching problem is a static non-cooperative one-shot game, in reality the "matching game" is played by parents who choose their strategies after consulting or chatting with other parents in their social networks. In this paper we compare the performance of the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in the presence of chatting through social networks. Our results indicate that allowing subjects to chat has an important impact on the likelihood that subjects change their strategies and also on the welfare and stability of the outcomes determined by the mechanism.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - Aug 7 2014

    Fingerprint

    Communication networks
    Social networks
    Experimental study
    Matching problem
    Consulting

    Keywords

    • Chat
    • Matching
    • Mechanism design
    • Networks
    • School choice

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Matching and chatting : An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms. / Ding, Tingting; Schotter, Andrew.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, 07.08.2014.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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