Matching and bargaining models of markets

Approximating small markets by large markets

John Wooders

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)215-224
    Number of pages10
    JournalEconomic Theory
    Volume11
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

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    Matching model
    Bargaining model

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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    Matching and bargaining models of markets : Approximating small markets by large markets. / Wooders, John.

    In: Economic Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1, 01.01.1998, p. 215-224.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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