Mastering Mary

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

I make three claims about the interactions between concept mastery and the knowledge argument. first, I argue that, contra Ball (2013), the concept mastery response to the knowledge argument does not suffer from the heterogeneity of concept mastery. Second, I argue that, when doing metaphysics by relating propositions on the basis of whether a hypothetical agent who knew a base collection could infer a target proposition, it is legitimate to rely on propositions that are not contained in the base, as long as those propositions are required for mastery of relevant concepts. One upshot is that, when checking whether the physical truths a priori entail the consciousness truths, it is fair game to rely on substantive truths about consciousness. Third, I argue that the only version of the knowledge argument that has any hope of succeeding against physicalism completely lacks the argument's driving intuition: that Mary learns something new when she emerges from the black and white room.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)361-370
Number of pages10
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume56
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

Fingerprint

Mastery
Knowledge Argument
Consciousness
Intuition
Physical
Metaphysics
Physicalism
White Room
Interaction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Mastering Mary. / Rabin, Gabriel.

In: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 01.01.2019, p. 361-370.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Rabin, G 2019, 'Mastering Mary', American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 361-370.
Rabin, Gabriel. / Mastering Mary. In: American Philosophical Quarterly. 2019 ; Vol. 56, No. 4. pp. 361-370.
@article{22bf319fc3c24747a089210b71722aa8,
title = "Mastering Mary",
abstract = "I make three claims about the interactions between concept mastery and the knowledge argument. first, I argue that, contra Ball (2013), the concept mastery response to the knowledge argument does not suffer from the heterogeneity of concept mastery. Second, I argue that, when doing metaphysics by relating propositions on the basis of whether a hypothetical agent who knew a base collection could infer a target proposition, it is legitimate to rely on propositions that are not contained in the base, as long as those propositions are required for mastery of relevant concepts. One upshot is that, when checking whether the physical truths a priori entail the consciousness truths, it is fair game to rely on substantive truths about consciousness. Third, I argue that the only version of the knowledge argument that has any hope of succeeding against physicalism completely lacks the argument's driving intuition: that Mary learns something new when she emerges from the black and white room.",
author = "Gabriel Rabin",
year = "2019",
month = "1",
day = "1",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "56",
pages = "361--370",
journal = "American Philosophical Quarterly",
issn = "0003-0481",
publisher = "University of Illinois Press",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mastering Mary

AU - Rabin, Gabriel

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - I make three claims about the interactions between concept mastery and the knowledge argument. first, I argue that, contra Ball (2013), the concept mastery response to the knowledge argument does not suffer from the heterogeneity of concept mastery. Second, I argue that, when doing metaphysics by relating propositions on the basis of whether a hypothetical agent who knew a base collection could infer a target proposition, it is legitimate to rely on propositions that are not contained in the base, as long as those propositions are required for mastery of relevant concepts. One upshot is that, when checking whether the physical truths a priori entail the consciousness truths, it is fair game to rely on substantive truths about consciousness. Third, I argue that the only version of the knowledge argument that has any hope of succeeding against physicalism completely lacks the argument's driving intuition: that Mary learns something new when she emerges from the black and white room.

AB - I make three claims about the interactions between concept mastery and the knowledge argument. first, I argue that, contra Ball (2013), the concept mastery response to the knowledge argument does not suffer from the heterogeneity of concept mastery. Second, I argue that, when doing metaphysics by relating propositions on the basis of whether a hypothetical agent who knew a base collection could infer a target proposition, it is legitimate to rely on propositions that are not contained in the base, as long as those propositions are required for mastery of relevant concepts. One upshot is that, when checking whether the physical truths a priori entail the consciousness truths, it is fair game to rely on substantive truths about consciousness. Third, I argue that the only version of the knowledge argument that has any hope of succeeding against physicalism completely lacks the argument's driving intuition: that Mary learns something new when she emerges from the black and white room.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072321773&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85072321773&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:85072321773

VL - 56

SP - 361

EP - 370

JO - American Philosophical Quarterly

JF - American Philosophical Quarterly

SN - 0003-0481

IS - 4

ER -