Markets and contracts

Alberto Bisin, J. D. Geanakoplos, P. Gottardi, E. Minelli, H. Polemarchakis

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained suboptimal: there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)279-288
    Number of pages10
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Volume47
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 2011

    Fingerprint

    Competitive Equilibrium
    Taxation
    Rigidity
    Asymmetric Information
    Private Information
    General Equilibrium
    Tax
    Pareto
    Modeling
    Market
    Competitive equilibrium
    Model

    Keywords

    • Asymmetric information
    • Competitive markets
    • Equilibrium

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Bisin, A., Geanakoplos, J. D., Gottardi, P., Minelli, E., & Polemarchakis, H. (2011). Markets and contracts. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47(3), 279-288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.017

    Markets and contracts. / Bisin, Alberto; Geanakoplos, J. D.; Gottardi, P.; Minelli, E.; Polemarchakis, H.

    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 47, No. 3, 05.2011, p. 279-288.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bisin, A, Geanakoplos, JD, Gottardi, P, Minelli, E & Polemarchakis, H 2011, 'Markets and contracts', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 279-288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.017
    Bisin A, Geanakoplos JD, Gottardi P, Minelli E, Polemarchakis H. Markets and contracts. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2011 May;47(3):279-288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.017
    Bisin, Alberto ; Geanakoplos, J. D. ; Gottardi, P. ; Minelli, E. ; Polemarchakis, H. / Markets and contracts. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2011 ; Vol. 47, No. 3. pp. 279-288.
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