Marketplaces and matching

Melvyn G. Coles, Eric Smith

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper models trading patterns when marketplaces exist and goods are differentiated. When first visiting the market, a buyer samples a stock of goods. If fortunate, the buyer finds a match, purchases one of these goods and then exits. If not, the buyer can now only match with the flow of new goods. In a steady state, the stock of unmatched traders on one side of the market is trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side. This behaviour is shown to describe matching patterns between unemployed job seekers and vacancies in U.K. Job Centres.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)239-254
Number of pages16
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume39
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1998

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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