Lowest unique bid auctions with resubmission opportunities

Yida Xu, Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    The recent online platforms propose multiple items for bidding. The state of the art, however, is limited to the analysis of one item auction. In this paper we study multi-item lowest unique bid auctions (LUBA) in discrete bid spaces under budget constraints. We show the existence of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria for an arbitrary number of bidders and items. The equilibrium is explicitly computed in two bidder setup with resubmission possibilities. In the general setting we propose a distributed strategic learning algorithm to approximate equilibria. Computer simulations indicate that the error quickly decays in few number of steps by means of speedup techniques. When the number of bidders per item follows a Poisson distribution, it is shown that the seller can get a non-negligible revenue on several items, and hence making a partial revelation of the true value of the items.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationICAART 2018 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence
    PublisherSciTePress
    Pages330-337
    Number of pages8
    Volume2
    ISBN (Electronic)9789897582752
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2018
    Event10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence, ICAART 2018 - Funchal, Madeira, Portugal
    Duration: Jan 16 2018Jan 18 2018

    Other

    Other10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence, ICAART 2018
    CountryPortugal
    CityFunchal, Madeira
    Period1/16/181/18/18

    Fingerprint

    Poisson distribution
    Learning algorithms
    Computer simulation

    Keywords

    • Auction
    • Game Theory
    • Imitative Learning
    • LUBA
    • Reinforcement Learning

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Software
    • Control and Systems Engineering
    • Artificial Intelligence

    Cite this

    Xu, Y., & Hamidou, T. (2018). Lowest unique bid auctions with resubmission opportunities. In ICAART 2018 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 2, pp. 330-337). SciTePress.

    Lowest unique bid auctions with resubmission opportunities. / Xu, Yida; Hamidou, Tembine.

    ICAART 2018 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. Vol. 2 SciTePress, 2018. p. 330-337.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Xu, Y & Hamidou, T 2018, Lowest unique bid auctions with resubmission opportunities. in ICAART 2018 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. vol. 2, SciTePress, pp. 330-337, 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence, ICAART 2018, Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, 1/16/18.
    Xu Y, Hamidou T. Lowest unique bid auctions with resubmission opportunities. In ICAART 2018 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. Vol. 2. SciTePress. 2018. p. 330-337
    Xu, Yida ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Lowest unique bid auctions with resubmission opportunities. ICAART 2018 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. Vol. 2 SciTePress, 2018. pp. 330-337
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