Low-resource routing attacks against Tor

Kevin Bauer, Damon McCoy, Dirk Grunwald, Tadayoshi Kohno, Douglas Sicker

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    Tor has become one of the most popular overlay networks for anonymizing TCP traffic. Its popularity is due in part to its perceived strong anonymity properties and its relatively low latency service. Low latency is achieved through Tor's ability to balance the traffic load by optimizing Tor router selection to probabilistically favor routers with highbandwidth capabilities. We investigate how Tor's routing optimizations impact its ability to provide strong anonymity. Through experiments conducted on PlanetLab, we show the extent to which routing performance optimizations have left the system vulnerable to end-to-end traffic analysis attacks from non-global adversaries with minimal resources. Further, we demonstrate that entry guards, added to mitigate path disruption attacks, are themselves vulnerable to attack. Finally, we explore solutions to improve Tor's current routing algorithms and propose alternative routing strategies that prevent some of the routing attacks used in our experiments.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationWPES'07 - Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society
    Pages11-20
    Number of pages10
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2007
    Event6th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES'07, Held in Association with the 14th ACM Computer and Communications Security Conference - Alexandria, VA, United States
    Duration: Oct 29 2007Oct 29 2007

    Publication series

    NameWPES'07 - Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society

    Other

    Other6th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES'07, Held in Association with the 14th ACM Computer and Communications Security Conference
    CountryUnited States
    CityAlexandria, VA
    Period10/29/0710/29/07

    Keywords

    • anonymity
    • load balancing
    • tor
    • traffic analysis

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

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  • Cite this

    Bauer, K., McCoy, D., Grunwald, D., Kohno, T., & Sicker, D. (2007). Low-resource routing attacks against Tor. In WPES'07 - Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society (pp. 11-20). (WPES'07 - Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society). https://doi.org/10.1145/1314333.1314336