Lobbying and taxes

Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, Jeffrey Timmons

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)893-909
    Number of pages17
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    Volume53
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2009

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    taxes
    firm
    lobby
    expenditures
    costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Richter, B. K., Samphantharak, K., & Timmons, J. (2009). Lobbying and taxes. American Journal of Political Science, 53(4), 893-909. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x

    Lobbying and taxes. / Richter, Brian Kelleher; Samphantharak, Krislert; Timmons, Jeffrey.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 4, 01.10.2009, p. 893-909.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Richter, BK, Samphantharak, K & Timmons, J 2009, 'Lobbying and taxes', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 893-909. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x
    Richter BK, Samphantharak K, Timmons J. Lobbying and taxes. American Journal of Political Science. 2009 Oct 1;53(4):893-909. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x
    Richter, Brian Kelleher ; Samphantharak, Krislert ; Timmons, Jeffrey. / Lobbying and taxes. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2009 ; Vol. 53, No. 4. pp. 893-909.
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