Lobbying and taxes

Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, Jeffrey Timmons

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)893-909
Number of pages17
JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
Volume53
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2009

Fingerprint

taxes
firm
lobby
expenditures
costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Lobbying and taxes. / Richter, Brian Kelleher; Samphantharak, Krislert; Timmons, Jeffrey.

In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 4, 01.10.2009, p. 893-909.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Richter, Brian Kelleher ; Samphantharak, Krislert ; Timmons, Jeffrey. / Lobbying and taxes. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2009 ; Vol. 53, No. 4. pp. 893-909.
@article{35ba6b139c46466eb9d78018f439a7de,
title = "Lobbying and taxes",
abstract = "Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1{\%} appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.",
author = "Richter, {Brian Kelleher} and Krislert Samphantharak and Jeffrey Timmons",
year = "2009",
month = "10",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "53",
pages = "893--909",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0092-5853",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Lobbying and taxes

AU - Richter, Brian Kelleher

AU - Samphantharak, Krislert

AU - Timmons, Jeffrey

PY - 2009/10/1

Y1 - 2009/10/1

N2 - Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

AB - Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70349321514&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=70349321514&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:70349321514

VL - 53

SP - 893

EP - 909

JO - American Journal of Political Science

JF - American Journal of Political Science

SN - 0092-5853

IS - 4

ER -