Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees

Rebecca B. Morton, Jean Robert Tyran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria - swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)485-509
Number of pages25
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume72
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2011

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Asymmetric information
Abstention
Voters
Vote
Quality information
Voting
Information quality
Asymmetry
Information asymmetry
Pure strategy equilibrium
Prediction

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Information aggregation
  • Swing voter's curse
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. / Morton, Rebecca B.; Tyran, Jean Robert.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 72, No. 2, 06.2011, p. 485-509.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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