Legislators as Lobbyists

Melinda N. Ritchie, Hye Young You

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Public policy is produced by elected and unelected officials and through the interactions of branches of government. We consider how such interactions affect policy implementation and representation. We argue that legislators try to influence bureaucratic decisions through direct communication with federal agencies, and that such contact is effective and has consequences for policy outcomes. We provide empirical evidence of this argument using original data about direct communication between members of Congress and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) along with decisions made by the DOL regarding trade and redistributive policies. We find that direct contacts influence DOL decisions, and the agency is more likely to reverse previous decisions when requested to do so by legislators. Our results challenge key assumptions and findings in the previous literature and have important implications for interbranch relations and informal means of control over the implementation of national policy.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalLegislative Studies Quarterly
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

    Fingerprint

    labor
    contact
    communication
    policy implementation
    interaction
    public policy
    evidence
    literature

    Keywords

    • bureaucracy
    • Congress
    • interbranch
    • legislators
    • public policy
    • representation
    • trade

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Legislators as Lobbyists. / Ritchie, Melinda N.; You, Hye Young.

    In: Legislative Studies Quarterly, 01.01.2018.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Ritchie, Melinda N. ; You, Hye Young. / Legislators as Lobbyists. In: Legislative Studies Quarterly. 2018.
    @article{73d74070ac4942d6a5e28d2aa2927298,
    title = "Legislators as Lobbyists",
    abstract = "Public policy is produced by elected and unelected officials and through the interactions of branches of government. We consider how such interactions affect policy implementation and representation. We argue that legislators try to influence bureaucratic decisions through direct communication with federal agencies, and that such contact is effective and has consequences for policy outcomes. We provide empirical evidence of this argument using original data about direct communication between members of Congress and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) along with decisions made by the DOL regarding trade and redistributive policies. We find that direct contacts influence DOL decisions, and the agency is more likely to reverse previous decisions when requested to do so by legislators. Our results challenge key assumptions and findings in the previous literature and have important implications for interbranch relations and informal means of control over the implementation of national policy.",
    keywords = "bureaucracy, Congress, interbranch, legislators, public policy, representation, trade",
    author = "Ritchie, {Melinda N.} and You, {Hye Young}",
    year = "2018",
    month = "1",
    day = "1",
    doi = "10.1111/lsq.12221",
    language = "English (US)",
    journal = "Legislative Studies Quarterly",
    issn = "0362-9805",
    publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Legislators as Lobbyists

    AU - Ritchie, Melinda N.

    AU - You, Hye Young

    PY - 2018/1/1

    Y1 - 2018/1/1

    N2 - Public policy is produced by elected and unelected officials and through the interactions of branches of government. We consider how such interactions affect policy implementation and representation. We argue that legislators try to influence bureaucratic decisions through direct communication with federal agencies, and that such contact is effective and has consequences for policy outcomes. We provide empirical evidence of this argument using original data about direct communication between members of Congress and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) along with decisions made by the DOL regarding trade and redistributive policies. We find that direct contacts influence DOL decisions, and the agency is more likely to reverse previous decisions when requested to do so by legislators. Our results challenge key assumptions and findings in the previous literature and have important implications for interbranch relations and informal means of control over the implementation of national policy.

    AB - Public policy is produced by elected and unelected officials and through the interactions of branches of government. We consider how such interactions affect policy implementation and representation. We argue that legislators try to influence bureaucratic decisions through direct communication with federal agencies, and that such contact is effective and has consequences for policy outcomes. We provide empirical evidence of this argument using original data about direct communication between members of Congress and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) along with decisions made by the DOL regarding trade and redistributive policies. We find that direct contacts influence DOL decisions, and the agency is more likely to reverse previous decisions when requested to do so by legislators. Our results challenge key assumptions and findings in the previous literature and have important implications for interbranch relations and informal means of control over the implementation of national policy.

    KW - bureaucracy

    KW - Congress

    KW - interbranch

    KW - legislators

    KW - public policy

    KW - representation

    KW - trade

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85055577604&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85055577604&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1111/lsq.12221

    DO - 10.1111/lsq.12221

    M3 - Article

    JO - Legislative Studies Quarterly

    JF - Legislative Studies Quarterly

    SN - 0362-9805

    ER -