Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession

James R. Hollyer, Bryan Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit member-states' trade policy discretion; consequently, policy uncertainty is mitigated. Reductions in policy uncertainty stemming from accession to a PTA improve the resource allocation decisions of the voters and reduce deadweight losses from the need to self-insure against policy uncertainty. The resultant increase in efficiency improves an incumbent government's-particularly a democratic government's-chance of surviving in office. We test this prediction using survival analysis, adjusting for potential selection biases using propensity score matching. We find robust support for the proposition that governments that sign PTAs survive longer in office than observationally similar governments that do not sign. In addition, we find that this effect is stronger in democracies than in autocracies.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)748-764
    Number of pages17
    JournalInternational Studies Quarterly
    Volume56
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 2012

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    uncertainty
    regime
    leadership
    trade policy
    democracy
    efficiency
    trend
    resources

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Political Science and International Relations
    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession. / Hollyer, James R.; Rosendorff, Bryan.

    In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 12.2012, p. 748-764.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Hollyer, James R. ; Rosendorff, Bryan. / Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession. In: International Studies Quarterly. 2012 ; Vol. 56, No. 4. pp. 748-764.
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