Labor market search and schooling investment

Christopher Flinn, Joseph Mullins

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We generalize a search, matching, and bargaining model to allow individuals to acquire productivity-enhancing schooling prior to labor market entry. In general, search frictions and weakness in bargaining position contribute to underinvestment in schooling from an efficiency perspective. Using estimates of a general equilibrium version of the model in which firm vacancy creation decisions are included, we find that minimum wages and schooling subsidies improve aggregate welfare, but have very different welfare impacts across the ability distribution. In particular, policies that maximize the average welfare of workers have strongly negative effects on the welfare of the least able.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)359-398
    Number of pages40
    JournalInternational Economic Review
    Volume56
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 1 2015

    Fingerprint

    Schooling
    Labor market search
    Vacancy
    General equilibrium
    Subsidies
    Workers
    Bargaining model
    Search frictions
    Minimum wage
    Market entry
    Matching model
    Labour market
    Productivity
    Underinvestment

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Labor market search and schooling investment. / Flinn, Christopher; Mullins, Joseph.

    In: International Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, 01.05.2015, p. 359-398.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Flinn, Christopher ; Mullins, Joseph. / Labor market search and schooling investment. In: International Economic Review. 2015 ; Vol. 56, No. 2. pp. 359-398.
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