Kant's standpoint on the whole

Disjunctive judgment, community, and the third analogy of experience

Beatrice Longuenesse

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    Kant claimed that the representation of the world by human beings depends on a system of fundamental categories or “pure concepts of the understanding.” He also claimed that these categories are originally nothing other than elementary logical functions, which find expression in logical forms of judgment. Kant expounded these functions in a systematic “table” that then became the architectonic principle not only for the Critique of Pure Reason but also for the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment. In a famous footnote to the Metaphysical Foundations of the Science of Nature (1783), Kant claimed that as long as one accepted the two cornerstones of his doctrine—the merely sensible, receptive character of our intuitions, for which space and time are a priori forms; and the derivation of categories from logical functions of judgment—then it mattered little if the details of his proofs (in particular, the details of his transcendental deduction of the categories) failed to carry complete conviction in the minds of his readers, for the two main points of his demonstration, as far as he was concerned, were sufficiently established. Those two points are that (1) we have a priori concepts of objects originating in the understanding alone, and (2) these concepts can be applied in cognition only to appearances (that is, to objects given in accordance with the a priori forms of space and time), not to things as they are in themselves.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationKant and the Concept of Community
    PublisherBoydell and Brewer Ltd
    Pages17-40
    Number of pages24
    ISBN (Electronic)9781580467810
    ISBN (Print)9781580463874
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2011

    Fingerprint

    Immanuel Kant
    Logic
    Architectonics
    Reader
    Conviction
    Metaphysical
    Logical Form
    Human Being
    Fundamental
    Cognition
    Nature
    Intuition
    Transcendental Deduction
    Practical Reason
    Critique of Pure Reason

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Arts and Humanities(all)

    Cite this

    Longuenesse, B. (2011). Kant's standpoint on the whole: Disjunctive judgment, community, and the third analogy of experience. In Kant and the Concept of Community (pp. 17-40). Boydell and Brewer Ltd.

    Kant's standpoint on the whole : Disjunctive judgment, community, and the third analogy of experience. / Longuenesse, Beatrice.

    Kant and the Concept of Community. Boydell and Brewer Ltd, 2011. p. 17-40.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Longuenesse, B 2011, Kant's standpoint on the whole: Disjunctive judgment, community, and the third analogy of experience. in Kant and the Concept of Community. Boydell and Brewer Ltd, pp. 17-40.
    Longuenesse B. Kant's standpoint on the whole: Disjunctive judgment, community, and the third analogy of experience. In Kant and the Concept of Community. Boydell and Brewer Ltd. 2011. p. 17-40
    Longuenesse, Beatrice. / Kant's standpoint on the whole : Disjunctive judgment, community, and the third analogy of experience. Kant and the Concept of Community. Boydell and Brewer Ltd, 2011. pp. 17-40
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