Kant?s categories and the capacity to judge

Responses to henry allison and sally sedgwick

Beatrice Longuenesse

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In response to Henry Allison?s and Sally Sedwick?s comments on my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, I explain Kant?s description of the understanding as being essentially a ?capacity to judge?, and his view of the relationship between the categories and the logical functions of judgment. I defend my interpretation of Kant?s argument in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B edition. I conclude that, in my interpretation, Kant?s notions of the ?a priori? and the ?given? are more complex and flexible than is generally perceived. Nevertheless, Kant maintains a strict distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, the ?passive? and the ?active? aspects of our representational capacities. This separates him from his German idealist successors, most notably Fichte and Hegel. Contrary to Sedgwick?s and Allison?s suggestions, I do not think that my interpretation tends to blur this distinction.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)91-110
    Number of pages20
    JournalInquiry (United Kingdom)
    Volume43
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 1 2000

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    Immanuel Kant
    Logic
    Successor
    Georg W.F. Hegel
    Idealist
    Spontaneity
    Transcendental Deduction
    Johann Gottlieb Fichte
    Receptivity

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Health Policy

    Cite this

    Kant?s categories and the capacity to judge : Responses to henry allison and sally sedgwick. / Longuenesse, Beatrice.

    In: Inquiry (United Kingdom), Vol. 43, No. 1, 01.03.2000, p. 91-110.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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