Kant on Causality

Beatrice Longuenesse

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first considers Kant's formulation of the problem of causality. It argues that Kant's questioning of the causal principle and his analysis of the concept of cause are best approached in light of his conception of logic, and more particularly in light of his conception of hypothetical judgments and hypothetical syllogisms. The second section considers Kant's proof of the causal principle in the Second Analogy of Experience. This relation provides an indispensable foundation for understanding Kant's argument on the conditions of time perception. However, the argument Kant provides does not appear to support the strong causal principle he claims to prove. This apparent discrepancy between Kant's claim and his actual argument in the specific context of the Second Analogy is a primary reason for the persisting disagreements about the meaning of the Second Analogy. The third section argues that Kant does provide an answer to the difficulty raised. This answer, however, relies not only on the discursive model of thought laid out in the first and second sections but also on Kant's conception of space and time as forms of intuition, as it emerges from the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEarly Modern Philosophy
Subtitle of host publicationMind, Matter, and Metaphysics
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780199835553
ISBN (Print)9780195177602
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 14 2005

Fingerprint

Immanuel Kant
Causality
Conception
Causal
Causes
Questioning
Transcendental
Time Perception
Transcendental Deduction
Aesthetics
Thought
Logic
Intuition
Discursive

Keywords

  • Causal principle
  • Kant
  • Second analogy of experience
  • Space and time

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Longuenesse, B. (2005). Kant on Causality. In Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195177606.003.0014

Kant on Causality. / Longuenesse, Beatrice.

Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, 2005.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Longuenesse, B 2005, Kant on Causality. in Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195177606.003.0014
Longuenesse B. Kant on Causality. In Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 2005 https://doi.org/10.1093/0195177606.003.0014
Longuenesse, Beatrice. / Kant on Causality. Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, 2005.
@inbook{4b3bda05c4714a70827ea2d3262d0552,
title = "Kant on Causality",
abstract = "This chapter is divided into three sections. The first considers Kant's formulation of the problem of causality. It argues that Kant's questioning of the causal principle and his analysis of the concept of cause are best approached in light of his conception of logic, and more particularly in light of his conception of hypothetical judgments and hypothetical syllogisms. The second section considers Kant's proof of the causal principle in the Second Analogy of Experience. This relation provides an indispensable foundation for understanding Kant's argument on the conditions of time perception. However, the argument Kant provides does not appear to support the strong causal principle he claims to prove. This apparent discrepancy between Kant's claim and his actual argument in the specific context of the Second Analogy is a primary reason for the persisting disagreements about the meaning of the Second Analogy. The third section argues that Kant does provide an answer to the difficulty raised. This answer, however, relies not only on the discursive model of thought laid out in the first and second sections but also on Kant's conception of space and time as forms of intuition, as it emerges from the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.",
keywords = "Causal principle, Kant, Second analogy of experience, Space and time",
author = "Beatrice Longuenesse",
year = "2005",
month = "7",
day = "14",
doi = "10.1093/0195177606.003.0014",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780195177602",
booktitle = "Early Modern Philosophy",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Kant on Causality

AU - Longuenesse, Beatrice

PY - 2005/7/14

Y1 - 2005/7/14

N2 - This chapter is divided into three sections. The first considers Kant's formulation of the problem of causality. It argues that Kant's questioning of the causal principle and his analysis of the concept of cause are best approached in light of his conception of logic, and more particularly in light of his conception of hypothetical judgments and hypothetical syllogisms. The second section considers Kant's proof of the causal principle in the Second Analogy of Experience. This relation provides an indispensable foundation for understanding Kant's argument on the conditions of time perception. However, the argument Kant provides does not appear to support the strong causal principle he claims to prove. This apparent discrepancy between Kant's claim and his actual argument in the specific context of the Second Analogy is a primary reason for the persisting disagreements about the meaning of the Second Analogy. The third section argues that Kant does provide an answer to the difficulty raised. This answer, however, relies not only on the discursive model of thought laid out in the first and second sections but also on Kant's conception of space and time as forms of intuition, as it emerges from the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

AB - This chapter is divided into three sections. The first considers Kant's formulation of the problem of causality. It argues that Kant's questioning of the causal principle and his analysis of the concept of cause are best approached in light of his conception of logic, and more particularly in light of his conception of hypothetical judgments and hypothetical syllogisms. The second section considers Kant's proof of the causal principle in the Second Analogy of Experience. This relation provides an indispensable foundation for understanding Kant's argument on the conditions of time perception. However, the argument Kant provides does not appear to support the strong causal principle he claims to prove. This apparent discrepancy between Kant's claim and his actual argument in the specific context of the Second Analogy is a primary reason for the persisting disagreements about the meaning of the Second Analogy. The third section argues that Kant does provide an answer to the difficulty raised. This answer, however, relies not only on the discursive model of thought laid out in the first and second sections but also on Kant's conception of space and time as forms of intuition, as it emerges from the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

KW - Causal principle

KW - Kant

KW - Second analogy of experience

KW - Space and time

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84922761467&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84922761467&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/0195177606.003.0014

DO - 10.1093/0195177606.003.0014

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780195177602

BT - Early Modern Philosophy

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -