Joint-search theory: New opportunities and new frictions

Bulent Guler, Fatih Guvenen, Giovanni L. Violante

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The job-search problem of couples differs in significant ways from that of singles. We characterize the reservation wage strategies of a couple that perfectly pools income to understand the ramifications of joint search for individual labor market outcomes. Two cases are analyzed. First, when couples are risk averse and pool income, joint search yields new opportunities relative to single-agent search. Second, when spouses receive job offers from multiple locations and incur a cost when living apart, joint search features new frictions and can lead to worse outcomes than single-agent search.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)352-369
    Number of pages18
    JournalJournal of Monetary Economics
    Volume59
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 2012

    Fingerprint

    Search theory
    Friction
    Income
    Labor market outcomes
    Costs
    Reservation wage
    Risk-averse
    Spouses
    Job search

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Joint-search theory : New opportunities and new frictions. / Guler, Bulent; Guvenen, Fatih; Violante, Giovanni L.

    In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 59, No. 4, 05.2012, p. 352-369.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Guler, Bulent ; Guvenen, Fatih ; Violante, Giovanni L. / Joint-search theory : New opportunities and new frictions. In: Journal of Monetary Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 59, No. 4. pp. 352-369.
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