Job search with bidder memories

Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, Guido Menzio, Eric Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This article revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)639-655
    Number of pages17
    JournalInternational Economic Review
    Volume52
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Aug 1 2011

    Fingerprint

    Workers
    Job search
    Bidding
    Employers
    Diamond paradox
    Hiring
    Rent

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Carrillo-Tudela, C., Menzio, G., & Smith, E. (2011). Job search with bidder memories. International Economic Review, 52(3), 639-655. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00643.x

    Job search with bidder memories. / Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Menzio, Guido; Smith, Eric.

    In: International Economic Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, 01.08.2011, p. 639-655.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Carrillo-Tudela, C, Menzio, G & Smith, E 2011, 'Job search with bidder memories', International Economic Review, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 639-655. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00643.x
    Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos ; Menzio, Guido ; Smith, Eric. / Job search with bidder memories. In: International Economic Review. 2011 ; Vol. 52, No. 3. pp. 639-655.
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