Jaina logic and the philosophical basis of pluralism

Jonardon Ganeri

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    What is the rational response when confronted with a set of propositions each of which we have some reason to accept, and yet which taken together form an inconsistent class? This was, in a nutshell, the problem addressed by the Jaina logicians of classical India, and the solution they gave is, I think, of great interest, both for what it tells us about the relationship between rationality and consistency, and for what we can learn about the logical basis of philosophical pluralism. The Jainas claim that we can continue to reason in spite of the presence of inconsistencies, and indeed construct a many-valued logical system tailored to the purpose. My aim in this paper is to offer a new interpretation of that system and to try to draw out some of its philosophical implications.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)267-281
    Number of pages15
    JournalHistory and Philosophy of Logic
    Volume23
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2002

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    Pluralism
    Logic
    Rationality
    Logicians
    India
    Inconsistency

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • History
    • History and Philosophy of Science

    Cite this

    Jaina logic and the philosophical basis of pluralism. / Ganeri, Jonardon.

    In: History and Philosophy of Logic, Vol. 23, No. 4, 01.01.2002, p. 267-281.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Ganeri, Jonardon. / Jaina logic and the philosophical basis of pluralism. In: History and Philosophy of Logic. 2002 ; Vol. 23, No. 4. pp. 267-281.
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