Issue advocacy and mass political sophistication

Catherine Hafer, Dimitri Landa

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We present a game-theoreticmodel of political discourse that explores how strategic incentives to make potentially persuasive arguments vary across different informational contexts. We show that political sophistication of the listeners fundamentally affects the speakers' incentives to make informative arguments, increasing the informed speech for speakers who are less likely to be successful in carrying the majority of the audience, and with it, the expected epistemic quality of majority choices.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)139-152
    Number of pages14
    JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
    Volume169
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 2013

    Fingerprint

    Advocacy
    Incentives
    Sophistication
    Discourse

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Issue advocacy and mass political sophistication. / Hafer, Catherine; Landa, Dimitri.

    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 169, No. 1, 03.2013, p. 139-152.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Hafer, Catherine ; Landa, Dimitri. / Issue advocacy and mass political sophistication. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2013 ; Vol. 169, No. 1. pp. 139-152.
    @article{83df0d71f7404fbf99846d401697c703,
    title = "Issue advocacy and mass political sophistication",
    abstract = "We present a game-theoreticmodel of political discourse that explores how strategic incentives to make potentially persuasive arguments vary across different informational contexts. We show that political sophistication of the listeners fundamentally affects the speakers' incentives to make informative arguments, increasing the informed speech for speakers who are less likely to be successful in carrying the majority of the audience, and with it, the expected epistemic quality of majority choices.",
    author = "Catherine Hafer and Dimitri Landa",
    year = "2013",
    month = "3",
    doi = "10.1628/093245613X660500",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "169",
    pages = "139--152",
    journal = "Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics",
    issn = "0932-4569",
    publisher = "JCB Mohr",
    number = "1",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Issue advocacy and mass political sophistication

    AU - Hafer, Catherine

    AU - Landa, Dimitri

    PY - 2013/3

    Y1 - 2013/3

    N2 - We present a game-theoreticmodel of political discourse that explores how strategic incentives to make potentially persuasive arguments vary across different informational contexts. We show that political sophistication of the listeners fundamentally affects the speakers' incentives to make informative arguments, increasing the informed speech for speakers who are less likely to be successful in carrying the majority of the audience, and with it, the expected epistemic quality of majority choices.

    AB - We present a game-theoreticmodel of political discourse that explores how strategic incentives to make potentially persuasive arguments vary across different informational contexts. We show that political sophistication of the listeners fundamentally affects the speakers' incentives to make informative arguments, increasing the informed speech for speakers who are less likely to be successful in carrying the majority of the audience, and with it, the expected epistemic quality of majority choices.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84874785687&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84874785687&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1628/093245613X660500

    DO - 10.1628/093245613X660500

    M3 - Article

    VL - 169

    SP - 139

    EP - 152

    JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

    JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

    SN - 0932-4569

    IS - 1

    ER -