Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in India

Leonid Peisakhin, Paul Pinto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Can freedom of information laws be harnessed by underprivileged members of society and used to obtain greater access to basic public goods that are otherwise attainable only through bribery? Drawing on a field experiment on access to ration cards among New Delhi's slum dwellers, we demonstrate that India's recently adopted freedom of information law is almost as effective as bribery in helping the poor to secure access to a basic public service. We find support for the theoretical proposition that greater transparency and voice lowers corruption even in highly hierarchical and unequal societies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)261-280
Number of pages20
JournalRegulation and Governance
Volume4
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2010

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corruption
transparency
freedom of information
India
experiment
evidence
Law
slum
public service
society
Society

Keywords

  • Corruption
  • Field experiment
  • Freedom of information
  • India
  • Public goods
  • Transparency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Law

Cite this

Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in India. / Peisakhin, Leonid; Pinto, Paul.

In: Regulation and Governance, Vol. 4, No. 3, 01.09.2010, p. 261-280.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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