Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? A model of the international criminal regime

Michael Gilligan

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    Recently, scholars have questioned whether enforcement mechanisms are necessary to make regimes effective. This article provides a model of the international criminal regime in which the regime changes state behavior even though it possesses no enforcement mechanisms. The article also answers several prominent criticisms of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics claim that the ICC is at best futile because it lacks the power to apprehend the criminals it is meant to prosecute. Even worse, the ICC may be harmful because it will induce atrocious leaders to hold on to power longer than they would if they could step down with immunity for past crimes. The model in this article suggests those criticisms may be inaccurate. I model the interaction between a leader and a foreign state that has the option of offering that leader asylum. I examine the effect of the creation of an ICC-like institution on that interaction. The model produces three main findings. (1) Leaders' reigns will not be prolonged as a result of the regime. (2) Although the institution has no enforcement power, some leaders (those with such a high probability of being deposed that they would willingly surrender to the institution rather than try to stay in office) will be punished by it. In those circumstances, the foreign state has no incentive to offer the leader asylum. (3) The institution may deter some atrocities at the margin.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)935-967
    Number of pages33
    JournalInternational Organization
    Volume60
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 2006

    Fingerprint

    International Criminal Court
    regime
    leader
    criticism
    immunity
    interaction
    Enforcement
    critic
    incentive
    offense
    lack
    Criticism
    Interaction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations
    • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
    • Law

    Cite this

    Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? A model of the international criminal regime. / Gilligan, Michael.

    In: International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 4, 10.2006, p. 935-967.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    @article{b205fdf9b3dd4d819e19c490ec5f28fc,
    title = "Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? A model of the international criminal regime",
    abstract = "Recently, scholars have questioned whether enforcement mechanisms are necessary to make regimes effective. This article provides a model of the international criminal regime in which the regime changes state behavior even though it possesses no enforcement mechanisms. The article also answers several prominent criticisms of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics claim that the ICC is at best futile because it lacks the power to apprehend the criminals it is meant to prosecute. Even worse, the ICC may be harmful because it will induce atrocious leaders to hold on to power longer than they would if they could step down with immunity for past crimes. The model in this article suggests those criticisms may be inaccurate. I model the interaction between a leader and a foreign state that has the option of offering that leader asylum. I examine the effect of the creation of an ICC-like institution on that interaction. The model produces three main findings. (1) Leaders' reigns will not be prolonged as a result of the regime. (2) Although the institution has no enforcement power, some leaders (those with such a high probability of being deposed that they would willingly surrender to the institution rather than try to stay in office) will be punished by it. In those circumstances, the foreign state has no incentive to offer the leader asylum. (3) The institution may deter some atrocities at the margin.",
    author = "Michael Gilligan",
    year = "2006",
    month = "10",
    doi = "10.1017/S0020818306060310",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "60",
    pages = "935--967",
    journal = "International Organization",
    issn = "0020-8183",
    publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
    number = "4",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? A model of the international criminal regime

    AU - Gilligan, Michael

    PY - 2006/10

    Y1 - 2006/10

    N2 - Recently, scholars have questioned whether enforcement mechanisms are necessary to make regimes effective. This article provides a model of the international criminal regime in which the regime changes state behavior even though it possesses no enforcement mechanisms. The article also answers several prominent criticisms of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics claim that the ICC is at best futile because it lacks the power to apprehend the criminals it is meant to prosecute. Even worse, the ICC may be harmful because it will induce atrocious leaders to hold on to power longer than they would if they could step down with immunity for past crimes. The model in this article suggests those criticisms may be inaccurate. I model the interaction between a leader and a foreign state that has the option of offering that leader asylum. I examine the effect of the creation of an ICC-like institution on that interaction. The model produces three main findings. (1) Leaders' reigns will not be prolonged as a result of the regime. (2) Although the institution has no enforcement power, some leaders (those with such a high probability of being deposed that they would willingly surrender to the institution rather than try to stay in office) will be punished by it. In those circumstances, the foreign state has no incentive to offer the leader asylum. (3) The institution may deter some atrocities at the margin.

    AB - Recently, scholars have questioned whether enforcement mechanisms are necessary to make regimes effective. This article provides a model of the international criminal regime in which the regime changes state behavior even though it possesses no enforcement mechanisms. The article also answers several prominent criticisms of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics claim that the ICC is at best futile because it lacks the power to apprehend the criminals it is meant to prosecute. Even worse, the ICC may be harmful because it will induce atrocious leaders to hold on to power longer than they would if they could step down with immunity for past crimes. The model in this article suggests those criticisms may be inaccurate. I model the interaction between a leader and a foreign state that has the option of offering that leader asylum. I examine the effect of the creation of an ICC-like institution on that interaction. The model produces three main findings. (1) Leaders' reigns will not be prolonged as a result of the regime. (2) Although the institution has no enforcement power, some leaders (those with such a high probability of being deposed that they would willingly surrender to the institution rather than try to stay in office) will be punished by it. In those circumstances, the foreign state has no incentive to offer the leader asylum. (3) The institution may deter some atrocities at the margin.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33646501638&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33646501638&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1017/S0020818306060310

    DO - 10.1017/S0020818306060310

    M3 - Review article

    VL - 60

    SP - 935

    EP - 967

    JO - International Organization

    JF - International Organization

    SN - 0020-8183

    IS - 4

    ER -