INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: A Simple Model of Tax Bargaining

Michael Laver

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Multinational corporations can play off host governments to minimise their tax payments in the absence of internationally coordinated fiscal policies. Without a supranational enforcement agency, most tax harmonization policies are unstable because one or another signatory always has an incentive to break ranks. This produces a sub‐optimal tax harvest for a group of host governments taken as a whole. This is a collective action problem for host governments which can be stated in the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma supergame. Equilibrium cooperative solutions have been suggested for this game which do not need higher authorities to enforce them. The application of these solutions to the host governments’ tax problem is discussed, with the conclusion that under certain conditions self‐policing tax harmonization agreements are possible.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)363-380
    Number of pages18
    JournalEuropean Journal of Political Research
    Volume5
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1977

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    multinational corporation
    taxes
    harmonization
    fiscal policy
    prisoner
    collective behavior
    incentive
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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS : A Simple Model of Tax Bargaining. / Laver, Michael.

    In: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1977, p. 363-380.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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