Interdependent network formation games with an application to critical infrastructures

Juntao Chen, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The increasing connectivity between critical infrastructures creates a network of networks in which the interdependencies between the networks play an important role in understanding the emerging functions and performances. To this end, this paper aims to establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the interactions between two system designers who aim to maximize individual network utilities. In particular, we use the game model to investigate the decentralized interdependent network for maximizing the algebraic connectivity of the global network. We develop an alternating play algorithm, and show its convergence to a Nash equilibrium network after a finite number of iterations. We corroborate our results through case studies of power and communication networks, and compare the Nash equilibrium solutions with their constrained team solution counterparts. The experimental results provide design guidelines and insights to increase the efficiency of the interdependent network formation games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2870-2875
Number of pages6
Volume2016-July
ISBN (Electronic)9781467386821
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 28 2016
Event2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016 - Boston, United States
Duration: Jul 6 2016Jul 8 2016

Other

Other2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016
CountryUnited States
CityBoston
Period7/6/167/8/16

Fingerprint

Critical infrastructures
Telecommunication networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Chen, J., & Zhu, Q. (2016). Interdependent network formation games with an application to critical infrastructures. In 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016 (Vol. 2016-July, pp. 2870-2875). [7525354] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACC.2016.7525354

Interdependent network formation games with an application to critical infrastructures. / Chen, Juntao; Zhu, Quanyan.

2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016. Vol. 2016-July Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 2870-2875 7525354.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Chen, J & Zhu, Q 2016, Interdependent network formation games with an application to critical infrastructures. in 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016. vol. 2016-July, 7525354, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2870-2875, 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016, Boston, United States, 7/6/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACC.2016.7525354
Chen J, Zhu Q. Interdependent network formation games with an application to critical infrastructures. In 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016. Vol. 2016-July. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 2870-2875. 7525354 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACC.2016.7525354
Chen, Juntao ; Zhu, Quanyan. / Interdependent network formation games with an application to critical infrastructures. 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016. Vol. 2016-July Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 2870-2875
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