Insurance premium allocation and loss prevention in a large firm. A principal agent analysis

Laurent L. Jacque, Charles Tapiero

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Faced with increased insurance costs, large firms are turning to a more systematic allocation of premium costs to 'subsidiaries' - an approach which capitalizes on economies of scale in a corporate-wide management of aggregated risks (risk pooled across divisions as well as subsidiaries). Such practice however, raises a number of problems: (i) What part of the aggregate risk should the firm self-insure, (ii) How should premium costs be allocated between subsidiaries, (iii) How much effort should subsidiaries invest in loss prevention programs and how should they manage claims (i.e. co-insure themselves), (iv) How can the parent firm induce managers of subsidiaries to control subsidiaries' risk, thereby reducing future premium payments and moral hazard. Or what premium incentive scheme can the firm devise to penalize (or compensate) subsidiaries investing less than an optimal effort in loss prevention. To deal with these problems, a conceptual framework, based on a principal-agents analysis and the definition of a liability account for each subsidiary is developed which is used to reduce the problems of moral hazard due to a less than perfect (or indirect) monitoring system. Specifically assumption regarding the premium allocation incentive scheme are made and explicit solutions are obtained for the control of subsidiaries loss prevention effort allocation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)231-245
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Banking and Finance
Volume6
Issue numberSUPPL. 1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1988

Fingerprint

Insurance premium
Large firms
Subsidiaries
Premium
Costs
Moral hazard
Incentive schemes
Liability
Payment
Insurance
Economies of scale
Monitoring system
Managers
Investing
Conceptual framework

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Insurance premium allocation and loss prevention in a large firm. A principal agent analysis. / Jacque, Laurent L.; Tapiero, Charles.

In: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 6, No. SUPPL. 1, 1988, p. 231-245.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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