Institutional determinants of trade policy

Fiona McGillivray, Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A series of formal models compares how institutions affect the distribution of trade protection. Specifically, we consider how the level of party discipline within majoritarian political systems affects the political incentives for leaders to supply protection to geographically distributed industries. In plurality systems with high party discipline, such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, industries concentrated in marginal electoral districts receive the most protection. In the United States, a plurality system with low party discipline, large industries geographically dispersed over many electoral districts receive the most favorable protection.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)119-143
    Number of pages25
    JournalInternational Interactions
    Volume23
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 1997

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    Keywords

    • Endogenous tariff theory
    • Party discipline
    • Political institutions
    • Protectionism
    • Tariffs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Political Science and International Relations

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