Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation

Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    Introduction This chapter, largely based on Genicot and Ray (2003), discusses group formation in the context of informal insurance arrangements with enforcement constraints. Risk-Sharing Agreements Risk is a pervasive fact of life for most people – especially so in developing countries. A high and often extreme dependence on volatile labor markets or agricultural production, widespread poverty, and the lack of access to formal insurance and credit serve to create a particularly acute problem of consumption smoothing. It is not surprising, then, that formal insurance arrangements are supplanted by widespread informal arrangements. Such arrangements are not based on contracts that are upheld by a court of law but on the implicit promise of future benefits from continued participation and its attendant mirror image: the threat of isolation from the community as a whole in the event of noncompliance. It hardly needs mentioning that there is considerable evidence of mutual insurance in village communities (Morduch 1991; Deaton 1992; Townsend 1994; Udry 1994; Jalan and Ravallion 1999; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2002; Grimard 1997; Gertler and Gruber 2002; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001). What is more interesting is that the same studies reveal a large departure from the ideal of perfect insurance. It is only natural to invoke various incentive constraints to explain the shortfall. Asymmetry of information, moral hazard, and the lack of enforceability are all potential impediments to widespread risk sharing. Of these three factors, it appears that the most important constraint arises from the inability to enforce risk-sharing agreements.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationGroup Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions
    PublisherCambridge University Press
    Pages430-446
    Number of pages17
    ISBN (Electronic)9780511614385
    ISBN (Print)0521842719, 9780521842716
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2005

    Fingerprint

    Informal insurance
    Risk sharing
    Insurance
    Group formation
    Enforcement
    Agricultural production
    Consumption smoothing
    Participation
    Poverty
    Mutual insurance
    Impediments
    Noncompliance
    Credit
    Labour market
    Asymmetry of information
    Incentives
    Factors
    Threat
    Moral hazard
    Developing countries

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    Genicot, G., & Ray, D. (2005). Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation. In Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions (pp. 430-446). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614385.015

    Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation. / Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj.

    Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions. Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 430-446.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Genicot, G & Ray, D 2005, Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation. in Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions. Cambridge University Press, pp. 430-446. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614385.015
    Genicot G, Ray D. Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation. In Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions. Cambridge University Press. 2005. p. 430-446 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614385.015
    Genicot, Garance ; Ray, Debraj. / Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation. Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions. Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp. 430-446
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