Inequality averse collective choice

Ahmet Ok

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The Lorenz-Pareto optimal frontier of a collective choice problem identifies a subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. An inequality averse choice function must thus be Lorenz-Pareto optimal in the sense that it should never 'choose' an outcome outside the Lorenz-Pareto frontier of any choice problem. We study the basic properties of the Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and, in particular, obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such choice functions. Several applications to the theory of Nash bargaining are also outlined.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)301-321
    Number of pages21
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Volume30
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - Oct 1998

    Fingerprint

    Choice Function
    Representability
    Bargaining
    Pareto
    Choose
    Necessary Conditions
    Subset
    Collective choice
    Sufficient Conditions
    Choice function

    Keywords

    • Axiomatic bargaining theory
    • C78
    • D71
    • Egalitarian collective choice
    • Rational choice

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Inequality averse collective choice. / Ok, Ahmet.

    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 10.1998, p. 301-321.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Ok, A 1998, 'Inequality averse collective choice', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 301-321.
    Ok, Ahmet. / Inequality averse collective choice. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1998 ; Vol. 30, No. 3. pp. 301-321.
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