### Abstract

The Lorenz-Pareto optimal frontier of a collective choice problem identifies a subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. An inequality averse choice function must thus be Lorenz-Pareto optimal in the sense that it should never 'choose' an outcome outside the Lorenz-Pareto frontier of any choice problem. We study the basic properties of the Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and, in particular, obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such choice functions. Several applications to the theory of Nash bargaining are also outlined.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 301-321 |

Number of pages | 21 |

Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |

Volume | 30 |

Issue number | 3 |

State | Published - Oct 1998 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- Axiomatic bargaining theory
- C78
- D71
- Egalitarian collective choice
- Rational choice

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics

### Cite this

*Journal of Mathematical Economics*,

*30*(3), 301-321.

**Inequality averse collective choice.** / Ok, Ahmet.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Journal of Mathematical Economics*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 301-321.

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Inequality averse collective choice

AU - Ok, Ahmet

PY - 1998/10

Y1 - 1998/10

N2 - The Lorenz-Pareto optimal frontier of a collective choice problem identifies a subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. An inequality averse choice function must thus be Lorenz-Pareto optimal in the sense that it should never 'choose' an outcome outside the Lorenz-Pareto frontier of any choice problem. We study the basic properties of the Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and, in particular, obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such choice functions. Several applications to the theory of Nash bargaining are also outlined.

AB - The Lorenz-Pareto optimal frontier of a collective choice problem identifies a subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. An inequality averse choice function must thus be Lorenz-Pareto optimal in the sense that it should never 'choose' an outcome outside the Lorenz-Pareto frontier of any choice problem. We study the basic properties of the Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and, in particular, obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such choice functions. Several applications to the theory of Nash bargaining are also outlined.

KW - Axiomatic bargaining theory

KW - C78

KW - D71

KW - Egalitarian collective choice

KW - Rational choice

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0009387982&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0009387982&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0009387982

VL - 30

SP - 301

EP - 321

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

SN - 0304-4068

IS - 3

ER -