Inequality and inefficiency in joint projects

Debraj Ray, Jean Marie Baland, Olivier Dagnelie

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. For higher elasticities of substitution, perfect equality is no longer unimprovable. Our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)922-935
    Number of pages14
    JournalEconomic Journal
    Volume117
    Issue number522
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2007

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    Inefficiency
    Elasticity of substitution
    Collective action
    Domination
    Equality

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Inequality and inefficiency in joint projects. / Ray, Debraj; Baland, Jean Marie; Dagnelie, Olivier.

    In: Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 522, 07.2007, p. 922-935.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Ray, D, Baland, JM & Dagnelie, O 2007, 'Inequality and inefficiency in joint projects', Economic Journal, vol. 117, no. 522, pp. 922-935. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02064.x
    Ray, Debraj ; Baland, Jean Marie ; Dagnelie, Olivier. / Inequality and inefficiency in joint projects. In: Economic Journal. 2007 ; Vol. 117, No. 522. pp. 922-935.
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