INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

Alessandro Citanna, Paolo Siconolfi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a competitive market for mechanisms, that is, for menus of contracts. Facing a budget constraint, informed individuals purchase (lottery) tickets to enter mechanisms, whereas firms sell tickets and supply slots at mechanisms at given prices. Beyond optimization, market clearing, and rational expectations, an equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change, or cut, prices. An equilibrium exists and is incentive efficient. An equilibrium can be computed as the solution to a programming problem that selects the incentive efficient outcome preferred by the highest type within an appropriately defined set. For two-types economies, this is the only equilibrium outcome.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1027-1056
Number of pages30
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume57
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2016

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Adverse selection
Insurance
Incentives
Purchase
Market clearing
Menu
Lottery
Programming
Competitive market
Budget constraint
Rational expectations
Efficient allocation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION. / Citanna, Alessandro; Siconolfi, Paolo.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, 01.08.2016, p. 1027-1056.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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